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| Tech 35 Attribute |
ISM Manual Attribute |
| Safety Standards |
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Clear, concise technical safety directives that are centrally developed and controlled, and are based on sound engineering judgment and data |
5.3 ew |
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• |
Technical specifications clearly control the safe operating envelope |
5.6 ew |
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Stringent quality assurance, safety management, and radiological protection requirements |
5.4 ew |
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Clear roles, responsibilities, and authorities; clear organizational structure and lines of authority |
2.3, 2.5 |
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Deviations from technical standards are rare, compelling, and approved centrally |
5.7 aew |
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Formal facility authorization agreements between owner and operator |
7.1 ew |
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Continuously improve safety standards and practices through lessons learned and safety research |
5.10 aew, 3.5,, 3.7, 3.9 |
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| Safety Attitude |
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Prove that there is no safety problem before starting work |
7.2, 7.4 |
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Senior leaders are committed to the mission and are drivers of safety, especially nuclear safety |
1,3, 1,5, 1,6, 2.8,
sp-4.9 |
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• |
Rigorous adherence to safety standards and regulations |
2.7 aew, 2.9, 5.9 |
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Equal value of safety and productivity |
4.4, 4.2 |
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Workers at any level can stop unsafe work |
sp-2.1, sp-4.3 |
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Question deviances, and avoid institutional complacency or arrogance based on past successes |
3.7, 5,10, sp-1.2,
sp-2.8 |
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Senior managers continuously stress safety of operations and individual accountability for safety |
1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8, 2.9
sp-4.9 |
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Encourage a questioning attitude and constructive skepticism; challenge conclusions |
sp-1.4, sp-1.5 aew, sp-2.1, sp-4.3, sp-4.8 |
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Safety and its ownership are apparent in everyone's actions and deeds |
1.3, 1.4, 1.6, 3.9,
sp-1.3 |
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Respect for radioactive materials, criticality and other hazards associated with nuclear activities |
5.4, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 |
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• |
Timely and unfiltered alerts of problems and credible operational information through multiple paths of communication |
3.5, 3.6, 5.10, sp-3.7, sp-4.1, sp-4.5 |
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Self-reporting encouraged, and identification of safety errors/failures rewarded |
sp-1.4, sp-2.2, sp-4.3, , sp-4.8 |
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Strong sense of mission with balanced production and defined safety goals |
4.1, 4.3 aew, 4.9 |
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| Technical Excellence |
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Robust facility designs using established codes and standards |
5.1 aew |
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Safety analysis based on sound engineering judgment and data |
5.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 |
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Defense in depth designed into nuclear facilities, including independent, redundant, and diverse safety systems that are not overly complex |
6.4 aew |
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Solid foundation of science and engineering, including physics, chemistry, and nuclear technologies |
3.2, 3.3 |
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Technical support personnel have expert-level technical understanding |
3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6 |
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Senior managers have strong technical backgrounds |
3.3 aew |
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Recurrent and relevant training |
3.5, 3.6 |
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Continuing focus on nuclear safety research and testing |
~4.10 |
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Embedded technical and safety expertise |
3.2, 3.3 |
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High priority on recruiting, selection, and retention of technical staff |
3.1 aew |
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Complete system knowledge allows prompt anticipation or investigation of system
problems |
3.6 |
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Personnel have in-depth understanding of safety and technical aspects of job |
3.3 ew |
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Strong safety development and testing capability |
3.5, 3.6, |
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Risk management tools integrated into decisions |
~ sp-1.3 |
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Seek to identify safety problems that are not known or expected |
6.1 |
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| Operational Excellence |
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Hazards are controlled to prevent or mitigate accidents |
6.1 ew |
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Adherence to technical procedures (or stopping and correcting procedure) is a fundamental expectation |
2.7, 5.8 |
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Nuclear facility construction follows rigorous quality assurance, configuration management, and safety practices |
5.1 |
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Systems and equipment maintained in accordance with the facility design basis |
5.4, 5.5, 5.6 |
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Managers maintain awareness of operational conditions/issues |
1.2, 1.4 |
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Operations are prepared and ready to operate safely prior to independent readiness reviews |
~7.2 |
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Readiness verified before starting hazardous work |
7.2 |
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Flexible response to off-normal and emergency events through relentless preparation and training |
3.6, sp1-7 ew |
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Safety embedded in processes and procedures through a functioning formal ISM system |
~ 5.5 |
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Aggressive reporting and evaluation of occurrences, deviations, etc. |
sp-1.2, sp-2.4, sp-4.5 |
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Decentralized operational authority during off-normal events |
sp-1.6 aew |
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Operations personnel held to a high standard of technical understanding, not just task-oriented training |
sp-1.7 aew |
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Safety margins are carefully maintained |
5.6 |
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Safety Resources |
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Safety issues and productivity carry equal weight for funding allocations and schedule flexibility |
4.4 aew |
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Resources available for safety upgrades and repairs to aging infrastructure |
4.10 aew |
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Continuity/constancy of key technical officials |
4.8 |
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Safety positions have adequate organizational influence |
4.10 aew |
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Sufficient redundancy in organizational safety functions |
4.6 aew |
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Modern infrastructure and new facility construction are funded |
4-11 aew |
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System of priority checks and balances from top to bottom |
4-9 aew |
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Independently funded safety research |
~4.10 |
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| Performance Assurance |
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Robust, frequent, and independent oversight |
sp-3.1 aew, sp-4.1 |
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DOE/NNSA managers actively involved in safety issues and performance assurance |
sp-3.8 aew |
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Rapid response to problems and closeout of issues |
~sp-3.7 |
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High-quality root-cause analysis |
sp-4.7 |
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Performance is tracked based on valid indicators and robust trend analysis |
sp-1.1 aew |
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Performance oversight at all levels |
sp-1.1 aew |
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Learn using a feedback and improvement program designed to capture industry-wide lessons |
3-6, sp-4.1 |
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Readiness for high-risk activities verified by DOE/NNSA-partially |
7.1 |
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Decentralized assessment and corrective action programs |
sp-3.1, sp-3.4, sp-3.7 |
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Linkages among problems and organizational issues are examined |
sp-4.2 ew |
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Centralized verification of compliance with safety and technical requirements |
~7.3 |
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Robust assessment and corrective action programs, including effective tracking of issues |
sp-3.1, sp-3.7, sp-4.1 |